JOHN STUART MILL ON RETRENCHMENT: FOCUSING ON THE MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF BRITAIN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

According to John Stuart Mill, retrenchment in some items of British public expenditure was important for national welfare, and in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, he remarked that British military expenditure, which then accounted for a large percentage of public expenditure, afforded scope for reduction. However, Mill did not always advocate a reduction in this expenditure because he opposed the prospect of diminishing the powers of the British army and navy with regard to preventing and carrying out wars. At least in the last decade of his life, Mill endeavored to maintain or increase those powers, and at the same time greatly to reduce British military expenditure, proposing the extension of suffrage, the resumption of the right of search, and the abolition of a large part of the permanent army of Britain through compulsory training of "the whole of the able bodied male population to military service."

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to supplement previous studies of John Stuart Mill's (1806–1873) theory of public finance, by examining his views on the amount of British military expenditure in the nineteenth century. For this purpose, Mill's other major works, articles, correspondence, and speeches, as well as his *Principles of Political Economy* (seven editions: 1848, 1849, 1852, 1857, 1862, 1865 and 1871; henceforth *Principles*), will be examined. This paper arrives at the conclusion that Mill, at least in the last decade of his life, endeavored to maintain or increase the real armaments of Britain, and at the same time greatly to reduce its military expenditure. It was most important for Mill in his later years not to diminish the powers of the British army and navy with regard to the prevention or carrying out of wars, and he tried to find the means for a reduction in British military expenditure that could at least maintain these powers.

A considerable number of studies have been conducted of Mill's views on public revenue, amongst which, in the past few decades, are the works of Hollander (1985, pp. 858–881), Ekelund and Walker (1996), Mawatari (1997a, pp. 388–399; 1997b, p. 148), Dome (1999a; 1999b; 2004, pp. 176–195) and O'Brien (2004, pp. 288–326). These examine Mill's ideas concerning taxes and/or national debt, focusing on distributive justice, equality, liberty and/or utility, and there is no doubt that they have produced

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dazzling results. However, his views on public expenditure (especially with regard to expenditure amounts) have seldom been investigated. For example, regarding Mill's theory of public expenditure, Musgrave (1959, p. 93) refers to the legitimate methods but not to the legitimate amounts of public expenditure (cf. Ide 1953, p. 467). Furthermore, as Kobayashi notes: "Previous studies on Mill's theory of public finance in both Japanese and English […] have only pointed out the rule of equality in terms of taxation (government revenue), that is to say […] the rule of equality of sacrifice" (1992, p. 3). The reason for this lack of a focus on public expenditure is that studies tend to refer only to the *Principles*.

Indeed, Mill did not systematically address public expenditure in the *Principles*. This is argued, for example, by Ide (1953), who, defining "a theory of public expenditure" (p. 467) as that which "investigates what methods and amounts of public expenditure are legitimate" (ibid.), remarks: "Mill's *Principles* did not include a formal theory of public expenditure" (ibid.). Fukuhara (1960) agrees with Ide (1953), observing the following: "[…] it should be noted that although Mill's theory of public finance included references to taxation and public debt, Mill […] scarcely referred to public expenditure in the *Principles*" (Fukuhara 1960, p. 89). More recently, Mawatari (1997b) has argued, "Mill's theory of public expenditure was very simple […] because it was not concerned with income redistribution and stabilization functions" (p. 148). He also notes that: "As for public finance, Mill was only concerned with examining ways to raise public revenue" (Mawatari 1997a, p. 412).

Mill did, however, refer in the *Principles*, to the necessity for a "great reduction" (*CW*, III, p. 865),[1] or "retrenchment" (ibid.) in some items of British public expenditure at that time.[2] For example, the third and all subsequent editions of the *Principles* state:

> […] while so[3] much of the revenue is wasted under the mere pretence of public service, so much of the most important business of government [such as "education" and "a more efficient and accessible administration of justice"][4] is left undone, that whatever can be rescued from useless expenditure is urgently required for useful. (ibid., pp. 865–866)

Moreover, as shall be shown in this paper, Mill talked about this retrenchment in his articles, correspondence, and speeches. It should also be added that the retrenchment

[1]In this paper, the *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* are cited as *CW*, with the volume number.
[2]This reference by Mill was based on "general expediency" (*CW*, III, p. 804).
[3]The word "so" was deleted in the fifth and all subsequent editions.
[4]For further details of "the most important business of government" that was "left undone," or "useful" expenditure, see the *Principles* (*CW*, III, p. 866; cf. ibid., II, pp. 18–19).

just mentioned was socially important at the time and was addressed not only by Mill but also by his contemporaries. "[R]etrenchment" (Mill to James Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1034; henceforth "Mill's Opinions") in British public expenditure was one of "various political questions of general interest" (ibid., p. 1032) on which, when standing for the general election of 1865, Mill was invited to state his opinions (cf. Elliot 1910, vol. 2, p. 22); according to Sir David Brewster's (1781–1868) pamphlet entitled *The Radical Party; Its Principles, Objects, & Leaders – Cobden, Bright & Mill*,[5] one of "the main fundamental principles of the Radical party" was "*Fiscal reform* – the adaption of an equitable and just system of taxation, with a view to the strictest economy in the national expenditure" (italics in the original; Brewster 1867a, p. 4; also Brewster 1867b, p. 5; cf. Section 4.1 below).

This paper focuses on British military expenditure in Mill's lifetime. One reason for this is that military expenditure, according to the *Principles*, was devoted to the exercise of the undisputed or "*necessary*" (italics in the original; *CW*, III, p. 800) function of government: "the protection of person and property against force and fraud" (ibid., p. 936; cf. Section II below). Another reason is that, as Mawatari (1997a, pp. 388–389) and Dome (1999a, pp. 82–84; cf. also Dome 2004, pp. 5–12) accurately point out, statistics (Mitchell 1962, pp. 396–397; also Mitchell 1988, pp. 587–588) show that British military expenditure accounted for a larger percentage of public expenditure in the nineteenth century than did expenditure on civil government. For example, Mawatari (1997a) says: "Military expenditure (especially on the navy) accounted for 30% and national debt service expenditure for 50% of British public expenditure in the nineteenth century" (p. 388), and:

> Looking at the long-term trends in the times of Mill's *Principles* (first edition 1848; seventh edition 1871), […] we also find that the ratio of British military expenditure to public expenditure had not decreased. Thus the British command of the seven seas and the "Pax Britannica" were supported by a remarkable amount of military expenditure. (ibid., p. 389)

Dome (2004) adduces the last paragraph of the *Principles* (*CW*, III, p. 971, cited in Dome 2004, p. 175) and declares, "Mill did not positively propose an increase in government expenditure, and suggested that a part of government expenditure on protection against force and fraud – typically on military services – should be shifted

[5]According to *The Radical Party*, Mill was one of "the leaders of the Radical party" (Brewster 1867a, p. 12; also Brewster 1867b, p. 12; cf. Varouxakis 2013a). In 1867, Brewster published at least the first, the second and the people's editions of this pamphlet. In the second edition, some sentences were deleted; however, the people's edition is the same as the second. The people's edition is therefore not cited in this paper.

into public services for national welfare" (Dome 2004, pp. 195–196; cf. pp. 174–175, 200–202). Dome devotes only one and a half pages (namely, Dome 2004, pp. 174–175) to the examination of Mill's views on public expenditure however;[6] thus, there is a possibility that one may infer, from Dome's assertion, that Mill advocated disarmament and a consequent reduction in military expenditure. This paper attempts to demonstrate that Mill, at least in his later years, essentially did not advocate the disarmament of Britain,[7] but endeavored nonetheless to reduce its military expenditure.

The following section addresses Mill's basic ideas concerning the armed forces and military expenditure. The third section investigates his grasp of the existing state of public finance of the British central government. The fourth section primarily examines what Mill proposed as the means for a reduction in British military expenditure: (1) the extension of suffrage, (2) the resumption of "the right of seizing enemies' goods in neutral vessels" (*CW*, I, p. 275; cf. *The Times*, August 6, 1867, p. 7), and (3) the abolition of a large part of the permanent army of Britain through compulsory training of "the whole of the able bodied male population to military service" (Mill to Edwin Chadwick, January 2, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1792). In relation to these policies, the means for military expenditure reduction that "the Radical party" advocated but that Mill opposed will be addressed briefly: (1) non-intervention in foreign affairs, and (2) the abolition of indirect taxes (cf. Brewster 1867a, pp. 4–5, 7–10; also Brewster 1867b, pp. 5, 8–11).

II. MILL'S BASIC IDEAS CONCERNING THE ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Needless to say, Mill thought armed forces necessary for self-defence.[8] In the *Principles*, Mill adduced "the protection of person and property against force and fraud" (*CW*, III, p. 936) as one of "the necessary functions of government": "the functions which are either inseparable from the idea of a government, or are exercised habitually and without objection by all governments" (ibid., p. 800). According to the *Principles*, this protection was fulfilled partly by an army or a navy: "[…] the prevention and suppression of force and fraud afford appropriate employment for *soldiers*, policemen,

[6]More papers are devoted by Dome (2004) to the examination of Mill's views on public revenue than to his views on public expenditure; with regard to the former, Dome (2004, pp. 176–195, 217–218) investigates Mill's articles, testimonies, and so on, as well as the *Principles*.

[7]Therefore, "Mill's Opinions" said that British military expenditure ought not to be reduced for the time being (Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1034, cited in Varouxakis 2013a: 131; cf. Section 4.1 below).

[8]On this point, see also Mill's "A Few Words on Non-Intervention" (1859; reprinted in 1867; henceforth "Non-Intervention"; *CW*, XXI, pp. 114, 118) and *Considerations on Representative Government* (three editions: 1861, 1861 and 1865; henceforth *Representative Government*; *CW*, XIX, p. 505).

and criminal judges" (emphasis added; ibid., p. 802; cf. *CW*, II, pp. 37–38; III, pp. 807–808, added by Mill in the sixth edition; Senior [1848] 1987, pp. 67–68).

Mill also argued that armed forces would be necessary for other purposes than self-defence. One of those purposes was "[i]ntervention to enforce non-intervention" (*CW*, XXI, p. 123). According to the "Non-Intervention," in "the case of a people struggling against a foreign yoke, or against a native tyranny upheld by foreign arms," a free civilized country was justified in helping, "otherwise than by the moral support of its opinion," this people in the struggle for free institutions: "Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent" (ibid.; cf. Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1033; Mill to Charles Loring Brace, September 23, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1838).

Additionally, the quality of armed forces was considered by Mill. In his speech entitled "The Army Bill" (1871),[9] he required that the armed forces of Britain ought to have an ample supply of the very best weapons and able soldiers: "Undoubtedly, this country ought to have the very best instruments of war which ingenuity can devise, and an ample supply of them and of men trained to use them" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 414).[10] The main reason for this was that Britain would have the key to all the future progress of human beings[11] and thus it ought to guard itself against possible attack. In other words, this proposal of Mill was based on "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being" (*CW*, XVIII, p. 224).

In order to maintain armed forces, some expenditure is inevitably required (cf. Smith [1776] 1976, pp. 687–688). In fact, in the *Principles*, Mill referred to "the expense and trouble of […] military and naval protection" (*CW*, II, p. 16), and in the *Representative Government*, he addressed the expenses of wars and of "military defence […] in time of peace" (*CW*, XIX, p. 566). Furthermore, according to the *Principles*, armed forces were almost always supported by public expenditure: "These functionaries [i.e. '*the soldier*, the policeman, and the judge'] […] are paid from *the taxes*" (emphasis

[9]This speech of March 10, 1871 was reported the following day in British newspapers, such as *The Daily News* (pp. 3, 4), *The Daily Telegraph* (p. 5), *The Pall Mall Gazette* (pp. 2, 7), *The Morning Post* (p. 3) and *The Times* (p. 10) (cf. *CW*, XXIX, p. 411).

[10]According to Mill's parliamentary speech of 1867, "inventive genius, with all the lights of modern science, and all the resources of modern industry" had brought "forth every year more and more terrific engines for blasting hosts of human beings into atoms" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 222; Varouxakis 2013b, p. 173; cf. Leslie [1867] 1879, pp. 132–133). In relation to this, John Elliot Cairnes (1823–1875) referred to "breech-loaders," "repeating-guns" and "the chassepôt" (Cairnes 1871, pp. 187–188; also Cairnes [1873] 2004, p. 235).

[11]For example, Mill said in the "Non-Intervention": "We are now in one of those critical moments, […] when the whole turn of European events, and the course of European history for a long time to come, may depend on the conduct and on the estimation of England" (*CW*, XXI, p. 113; cf. XIX, pp. 551, 565).

added; *CW*, II, p. 38).[12] In addition, Mill treated military expenditure not as a part of local authority but rather as a part of central government expenditure. In the *Representative Government*, Mill argued that foreign policies, including wars, needed to be pursued, and military expenditure to be incurred, by the central government: "[…] if these things [i.e. '[s]ecurity of person and property, and equal justice between individuals'] can be left to any responsibility below the highest, there is nothing, *except war and treaties*, which requires a general government at all" (emphasis added; *CW*, XIX, p. 541); and "the support of an army and navy" is one of "the expenses of government […] which must of necessity be general," and distinguished from "as many of the expenses of government as could by any possibility be made local" (ibid., p. 561).[13]

To sum up, Mill thought that armed forces – especially with regard to Britain, those which had an ample supply of the very best weapons and able soldiers – were necessary for self-defence and other purposes, and he regarded military expenditure as a part of central government expenditure.

III. MILL'S GRASP OF THE EXISTING STATE OF BRITAIN

3.1 The fiscal structure of Britain in the nineteenth century

Turning now to Britain in the nineteenth century, I will examine Mill's grasp of the fiscal structure of the British central government. To begin with, the revenue of this government, which was the condition of its existence (*CW*, III, p. 804), will be investigated. According to the *Principles*, the annual government revenue in the third quarter of the nineteenth century amounted to from about £50,000,000 to £70,000,000, greatly increasing until the early 1860s. To explain further, regarding "our present revenue," the first, second and third editions of the *Principles* (1848–1852) quoted the amount as "above fifty millions," the fourth (1857) "above sixty millions," the fifth (1862) "above seventy millions" and the sixth (1865) and seventh (1871) "about seventy millions"[14] (ibid., p. 865).[15] These differences were mainly caused by "the increasing productiveness of almost all taxes" (ibid., p. 742).

Next, the expenditure of that government will be examined. For the present, I shall confine my attention to its military expenditure, that is to say, "[t]hat part […] of the public expenditure, which is devoted to the maintenance of […] military

[12]As for "the agricultural communities of ancient Europe", Mill said of them in the *Principles*: "Taxes there were none, […] and the army consisted of the body of citizens" (*CW*, II, p. 15).

[13]In the *Principles*, Mill divided taxes into "the general taxes of the State" and "local taxes" (*CW*, III, p. 862; cf. pp. 821–822, 950, 955–956).

[14]This revision in the sixth edition admits to two interpretations: the reflection of a little decrease in "our present revenue," or the mere correction of a misprint.

[15]According to Brewster, "the national income" of Britain was "£71,135,286" in "the year ending 31st March, 1866" (Brewster 1867a, p. 8; also Brewster 1867b, p. 9).

establishments" (ibid.). With regard to times of war, Mill noticed an enormous amount of British military expenditure occasioned by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815) (*CW*, I, p. 101; II, pp. 76–77; IV, pp. 13, 14, 20; cf. Blake 1823, p. 5, cited in *CW*, IV, p. 5) and the Crimean War (1853–1856) (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 70).[16] In addition, with regard to times of peace, firstly, Mill pointed out an increase in British military expenditure in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. In his parliamentary speech entitled "England's Danger through the Suppression of Her Maritime Power" (1867; henceforth "England's Danger"), Mill described "[t]he immense burthen of our naval and military expenditure," saying that although nearly ten of eleven years from 1856 to 1867 had been "years of profound peace," Britain's naval and military expenses had increased until they exceeded "by about twenty millions a year […] what they actually ha[d] been in the life of the present generation" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 220). This increase was nearly equal to the above-mentioned one in British public revenue. Secondly, Mill remarked upon a large amount of British military expenditure on the army in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1871, Mill argued that this portion of British public expenditure, which was then annually devoted to the maintenance of its army, amounted to "£14,000,000" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 412).[17] This, at that time, accounted for 20% of British public revenue, namely about £70,000,000.

To sum up, Mill, at least during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, remarked upon a rapid increase in British military expenditure even in times of peace, and noticed that this expenditure accounted for a large percentage of public expenditure.

3.2 The possibility of reducing the military expenditure of Britain

It is possible that, at the time of writing of the first and second editions of the *Principles*, Mill thought that British military expenditure afforded no scope for a reduction. The main reason is that he, in these editions, referred to a factor in the increase in British military expenditure:

[16]Brewster said in 1867: "[…] wars […] have […] embarassed [*sic*] us with a huge national debt, such as no other country was ever burdened with" (Brewster 1867a, p. 9; also Brewster 1867b, p. 10). According to the *Principles*, the national debt service expenditure of Britain since 1848 had annually amounted to "nearly thirty [millions pounds]," that is to say, about 50% of the then public revenue (*CW*, II, p. 9; III, pp. 865, 878).

[17]According to Brewster, "[o]ur expenditure […] is on the most enormous and extravagant scale" (Brewster 1867a, p. 8; also Brewster 1867b, p. 8). Brewster, as well as Mill, said: "It is estimated, that since 1832, the House of Commons has voted supplies amounting to nearly £400,000,000 [i.e. above £11,000,000 a year] for the army, exclusive altogether of grants for war; […]" (Brewster 1867a, p. 10; also Brewster 1867b, p. 11). Additionally, Brewster went on to say: "The mal-administration and imbecility of the Board of Admiralty, has involved us in expenses for the navy, more than amounting to the sum expended on the army; […]" (ibid.).

> There is hardly any public reform or improvement of the first rank, proposed of late years, and still remaining to be effected, which would not probably require, at least for a time, an increased instead of a diminished appropriation of public money. Whether the object be popular education; emigration and colonization; […] *improvement in the condition of soldiers and sailors*; […] every one of these things implies considerable expense, […]. (emphasis added; *CW*, III, pp. 865–866)

On the other hand, in the third and all subsequent editions of the *Principles*, Mill clearly thought that British military expenditure afforded scope for a reduction. In the third edition (1852), firstly, the reference to "improvement in the condition of soldiers and sailors" was deleted (ibid., p. 866). Secondly, Mill said: "That part, indeed, of the public expenditure, which is devoted to the maintenance of civil and military establishments, (that is, all except the interest of the national debt,) affords ample scope for the largest retrenchment" (ibid., p. 865). Thirdly, the following passage was inserted: "the existing means would be more than sufficient if applied to the proper purposes" (ibid., p. 866). Indeed, by the fourth and in all subsequent editions, the tone of Mill's arguments about retrenchment had been a little muted. The following serves as an example: the above-mentioned passage "[t]hat part, indeed, of the public expenditure, […] affords ample scope for *the largest* retrenchment" was changed in the fourth edition to "[…] affords ample scope for retrenchment," and in the fifth edition to "[…] affords, *in many of its details*, ample scope for retrenchment" (emphasis added; ibid., p. 865). This lowered tone, however, does not essentially affect the matter in question.

As a further example of Mill's post-1852 idea regarding a reduction in British military expenditure, let us quote the following passage from "Mill's Opinions":

> 6. As regards retrenchment, it is certain that chiefly through unskillful management great sums of public money are now squandered, for which the country receives no equivalent in the efficiency of its establishments, & that we might have a more useful army & navy than we possess, at a considerably less expense. (Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1034)

It follows from what has been said that Mill, after 1852 at the latest, thought that there existed scope for a reduction in British military expenditure. The following section, therefore, will predominantly examine what Mill proposed as the means for this reduction.

IV. THE MEANS OF REDUCING THE MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF BRITAIN

4.1 The extension of suffrage

In the above-mentioned part of "Mill's Opinions," Mill went on to say:

> […] I expect little improvement in this respect until the increased influence of the smaller taxpayers on the government, through a large extension of the suffrage, shall have produced a stricter control over the details of public expenditure. But I cannot think that it would be right for us to disarm in the presence of the great military despotisms of Europe, which […] might be tempted to pick a quarrel with us […]. (Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1034)

The first thing that one notices is that Mill, even in times of peace, attached greater importance to the maintenance of British armaments than to a reduction in its military expenditure. The reason for this was Mill's worry about warlike countries of the Continent, such as the Second French Empire, Prussia and Russia (cf. Mill to Chadwick, December 29, 1866, ibid., pp. 1224–1225; Mill to Brace, January 19, 1871, *CW*, XVII, pp. 1799–1800; *CW*, XXVIII, pp. 225–226). Also, this quotation makes it clear that Mill did not always support a reduction in British military expenditure because he opposed reduction measures that would result in Britain's partial disarmament.

The second thing is that Mill, at least in April 1865, thought that almost only "a large extension of the suffrage"[18] could eliminate the waste of British military expenditure in general with the armaments of the British army and navy maintained or probably increased.[19] Mill, at that time, clearly opposed at least two means for a reduction in British military expenditure, which had been advocated by "the Radical party." One of these was "*Non-intervention in foreign affairs*, and the consequent reduction in our Naval and Military armaments" (italics in the original; Brewster 1867a, p. 5; also Brewster 1867b, p. 5). Brewster said about this means:

> By our adherence in the future, as far as possible, to this course of action [i.e. non-intervention in foreign affairs], we can have no excuse for the maintenance of our army and navy beyond the required efficiency of the services, for the purpose of home defence, and the necessary protection of our interests in our colonial dependencies. By this policy, we may expect to curtail the wasteful expenditure of the public money, that has been going on, almost unchecked, for years, more

[18]On this point, Mill said briefly in "Mill's Opinions": "I would open the suffrage to all grown persons, both men & women, who can read, write, & perform a sum in rule of three, & who have not, within some small number of years, received parish relief" (Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1032).

[19]Cf. "Mr. Hume's [Joseph Hume, 1777–1855] persevering scrutiny of the public expenditure, forcing the House of Commons to a division on every objectionable item in the estimates, had begun to tell with great force on public opinion, and had extorted many minor retrenchments from an unwilling Administration" (*CW*, I, p. 101). For "Mr. Hume's persevering scrutiny of the public expenditure," see also "England's Danger" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 220).

especially in our naval arsenals. (Brewster 1867a, p. 10; also Brewster 1867b, p. 11)

On the contrary, Mill, as has been stated in Section II above, justified "[i]ntervention to enforce non-intervention" (*CW*, XXI, p. 123). Therefore, he did not agree with this kind of a "reduction in our Naval and Military armaments" and consequently in British military expenditure (Varouxakis 2013a, pp. 129–132). Another and more important one of those two means was "*Fiscal reform* – the adaption of an equitable and just system of taxation, with a view to the strictest economy in the national expenditure" (italics in the original; Brewster 1867a, p. 4; also Brewster 1867b, p. 5; cf. Section I above).[20] According to Brewster, "the adaption of an equitable and just sytem of taxation" meant "the abolition of our present indirect system of taxation" (Brewster 1867a, p. 8; also Brewster 1867b, p. 9).[21] He argued that direct taxation would make people aware of the amount of taxes, consequently preventing extravagant military expenditure:

> A very important reason why a direct and equitable system is so strenuously advocated by Radical reformers, is, the greater interest it would create in the public mind, as regards the disbursement of the funds of the national exchequer. […] it is only by the hocus-pocus of a circuitous and indirect system, that keeps poor, heavily-laden John Bull […] ignorant of the amount of money the tax-gatherer quietly and invisibly relieves him of, that our rulers have been able to hood-wink us into supporting the costly and ruinous wars, and "bloated armaments," they have so often saddled us with. (Brewster 1867a, pp. 8–9; also Brewster 1867b, pp. 9–10)

In the *Principles*, Mill referred to his doubts about this "mode of thinking" by "many friends of improvement" (*CW*, III, pp. 864–866). Additionally, he opposed the abolition of indirect taxes: "I prefer a mixed system of direct & indirect taxation to either alone" (Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1032; cf. *CW*, III, pp. 864–868; V, pp. 496–497; XVIII, pp. 297–298).[22] In fact, although Brewster, in 1867, objected to the "Customs and Excise duties" such as those on tea, coffee and sugar (Brewster 1867a, p. 8; also Brewster 1867b, p. 9), Mill, in all the editions of the *Principles*, essentially permitted these indirect taxes, at least as they applied to Britain: "The duties […] on

[20]Brewster argued that this principle was "of the most vital importance" (Brewster 1867a, pp. 7–8; also Brewster 1867b, p. 8).
[21]Brewster said: "[…] for the year ending 31st March, 1866, £41,120,401, out of the £71,135,286, of the national income, were raised through Custom and Excise duties [i.e. indirect taxes]" (Brewster 1867a, p. 8; also Brewster 1867b, p. 9; cf. fn. 15 above).
[22]According to the *Principles*, "[a] direct tax is one which is demanded from the very persons who, it is intended or desired, should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another […]" (*CW*, III, p. 825). For "the theory of Taxation" (ibid., p. 804; cf. *CW*, IV, p. 318) in the *Principles*, see *CW*, III, pp. 805–879.

sugar, coffee, tea, wine, beer, spirits, and tobacco, are in themselves, where a large amount of revenue is necessary, extremely proper taxes; […]" (*CW*, III, p. 872).

To sum up, Mill, after April 1865 at the latest, regarded the extension of suffrage as the means to generally reduce British military expenditure, which would allow the government to at least maintain its armaments.

4.2 The resumption of the right of search

"England's Danger" (August 5, 1867),[23] as has been pointed out in Section 3.1 above, referred to the marked increase in the armaments and military expenditure of Britain from 1856 to 1867, namely almost wholly during times of peace:

> […] during this period, we have been engaged, not as might have been expected, in diminishing, but in enormously increasing our naval and military establishments, until our total expenses exceed by about twenty millions a year […] what they actually have been in the life of the present generation. (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 220)

The reason for this increase was "[t]o protect ourselves against the bloated armaments of our European neighbours" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 220; cf. pp. 128–129; Leslie [1867] 1879, pp. 128–129, 133). However, Mill thought that this increase would not afford Britain sufficient protection against those armaments; moreover, he argued that the right of search would resume without any costs:[24]

> Unless by resuming our natural and indispensable weapon [i.e. the right of search] we place ourselves again on an equality with our possible enemies, we shall be burthened with these enormous establishments and these onerous budgets for a permanency; and, in spite of it all, we shall be for ever in danger, for ever in alarm, cowed before any Power, or combination of Powers, capable of invading any part of our widely-spread possessions. (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 221)

The right of search is that "of seizing enemies' goods in neutral vessels" (*CW*, I, p. 275; cf. *The Times*, August 6, 1867, p. 7). According to Mill, this right was the naval powers'

[23]According to that part of Mill's posthumous *Autobiography* (1873) which had been written by early 1870, this parliamentary speech was "opposed to what then was, and probably still is, regarded as the advanced liberal opinion" (*CW*, I, p. 275). On this point, David Urquhart's (1805–1877) Foreign Affairs Committees said: "It is from the party of liberty and progress that the Foreign Affairs Committees have always found the most determined opposition in their efforts to obtain the abrogation of the Declaration of Paris. This opposition falls before the speech of Mr. John Stuart Mill" (Mill 1874, p. 1). See also Varouxakis (2013a; 2013b, pp. 175–179).

[24]Therefore, this right was called by Mill "the natural weapon of a maritime nation" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 221).

"most powerful weapon of defence against the great military Powers" (Mill to J. George Mawby,[25] March 17, 1866, *CW*, XVI, p. 1153) and had been "our main defence" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 221).[26] Nevertheless, Britain, which was then the greatest naval power (ibid.), abandoned, like its European neighbours, this right by the Declaration of Paris of 1856.[27]

Mill argued that, in times of war, the exercise of the right of search would cause the disturbance of the maritime commerce of belligerent countries, or "the destruction of […] enemy's commerce" through "war on his imports and exports" (ibid., pp. 225–226).[28] According to Mill, this disturbance would have two consequences. The first was a comparative decrease in the powers of other countries than Britain to carry out wars. Mill's ideas were as follows: some part of the navy of every belligerent country would be "required to protect" its maritime "commerce", which might be interrupted by the navies of its enemies; a belligerent country whose navy was more powerful than those of its enemies, being more able to interrupt the maritime commerce of its enemies, could compel them to employ larger parts of their navies in this protection, and consequently reduce further that parts of those navies which were able to be employed in attacking belligerents (ibid., p. 223; cf. *CW*, XXIX, pp. 412–413); and Britain, as stated above, was then the greatest naval power (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 221). These ideas were represented, for example, in the following argument of Mill: the right of search and the consequent disturbance of maritime commerce in times of war would give, to some extent, disadvantages to France if its enemy was a greater naval power, namely Britain or the United States;[29] but they would give advantages to France if its enemies were other powers, such as Prussia or Russia (ibid., pp. 225–226).[30] According to "England's Danger," the right of search was the weapon in which "the other Powers" that were parties to the Declaration of Paris were "inferior" to Britain, and "that which

[25]Mawby was the secretary of one of Urquhart's Foreign Affairs Committees. According to Varouxakis (2013a, p. 133; 2013b, pp. 176–177), Mill, as well as Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–1883), had been influenced on the Declaration of Paris by Urquhart.

[26]According to Mill, "[t]he first Napoleon" (1769–1821) declaimed against the British exercising of the right of search, namely "our tyranny of the seas" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 225), and vindicated against Britain "the liberty of the seas" (Mill to Mawby, September 10, 1866, *CW*, XVI, p. 1199).

[27]For brief accounts of this Declaration, see *CW*, XVI, p. 1153 and Varouxakis (2013b, p. 172).

[28]Therefore, this right was also called by Mill "the right […] of warring against the commerce of our enemies" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 221) and "the power of attacking an enemy through his commerce" (*CW*, XXIX, pp. 412–413).

[29]According to "England's Danger," the United States was then "[t]he greatest naval Power after ourselves" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 221).

[30]On this point, see also the following quotation from Mill's letter: "[…] I certainly think that the Right of Search may, under many circumstances, be valuable to France as well as to England" (Mill to Mawby, September 10, 1866, *CW*, XVI, p. 1199).

once made a war with England a formidable thing, even to the united strength of all Europe" (ibid., p. 221).

The second consequence was an increase in the powers of countries to prevent wars, including Britain. To elaborate, Mill argued that economic losses occasioned by the disturbance of maritime commerce would make the people of every country dislike wars (ibid., pp. 224–225);[31] therefore, according to Mill, the right of search "might lead to reluctance to undertake wars, or to the shortening of their duration once they were started" (Varouxakis 2013b, pp. 151–153; cf. ibid., pp. 174–175, 178, 182–183; also Varouxakis 2013a, pp. 132, 141).[32]

Those two consequences would lead to a reduction in British military expenditure, and especially in that part of it which was devoted to the maintenance of the armed forces deployed in the British Isles.[33] In the first place, the armaments of the British army and navy necessary for self-defence would be reduced, because navies were essential for attacking the British Isles and comparatively smaller parts of the navies of other countries than Britain could be employed in attacking their enemies in times of war. In the second place, those armaments necessary to prevent or carry out wars would be reduced because there would be a smaller possibility of a breakout of war.

Although Mill, as has been mentioned, was "in favour of resuming the right of" search in August 5, 1867 (*CW*, I, p. 275), he could not determine his precise position regarding this right in his letter of September 10, 1866 (Mill to Mawby, *CW*, XVI, p. 1199; cf. *CW*, XXVIII, p. 225–226). It follows, therefore, that Mill, from September 1866 to August 1867, had made up his mind on this subject and had come to advocate the disownment of the Declaration of Paris; thus, his approval for the resumption of the right of search was consistent with the above-mentioned argument of him in 1865: that almost the only advisable means for a reduction in British military expenditure was "a large extension of the suffrage" (Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1034; cf. Section 4.1 above).

To sum up, Mill, after September 1866 at the earliest – August 1867 at the latest –,

[31]Therefore, the right of search was also called by Mill "the chief means they [i.e. the naval powers] possess of doing their enemies substantial damage, and wearying them of the war" (*CW*, XXVIII, p. 223).

[32]According to Goodwin (1991, p. 34), "classical economists" concluded that in order to ensure "international security," "there was no alternative to making the perceived costs of war exceed the perceived benefit." Although Mill's ideas about the right of search are not addressed by Goodwin (1991), these can be regarded as one of the concrete examples of his assertion.

[33]As for the British army, Cairnes (1871) said: "The entire aggregate of our military establishment of all arms, comprising colonial and West India corps, depôts of Indian regiments and other accessory establishments, amounts, *on paper*, to just 115,000 men. Of these the numbers in England amount to 82,000; […]" (italics in the original; p. 169; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 202–203).

regarded the resumption of the right of seizing enemies' goods in neutral vessels as the means to reduce the then increasing British military expenditure (especially that part of it which was related to the British Isles), which could comparatively or absolutely increase the powers of Britain to carry out or prevent wars. According to Mill, this resumption would recover these powers without any costs, and consequently could reduce – not being attended by any real disarmament of Britain – up to £20,000,000 of its military expenditure.

4.3 The abolition of a permanent army

In "The Army Bill" (March 10, 1871), Mill argued that defects in the British army were its enormous cost and insufficient armaments. According to this speech, British military expenditure on the army then amounted annually to "£14,000,000" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 412; cf. Section 3.1 above); "[b]ut our army," said Mill, "is vastly too large when it is not wanted, and vastly too small when it is" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 412). On the other hand, Mill declared that Prussian military expenditure on the army then amounted annually to only £7,000,000, but "the Prussian Government" was, nevertheless, "able […] to bring 500,000 trained men into the field at a fortnight's notice" (ibid.). Mill's arguments were clearly based on the article of Cairnes (1871, pp. 169–171; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 202–207).[34] Mill referred to this article in his letter (Mill to John Morley, January 6, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1795), and agreed with it almost entirely: "I myself go the whole length with Cairnes" (Mill to Chadwick, January 15, 1871, ibid., p. 1796).

In order to remedy those defects, Mill proposed the substitution of "[a] citizen army" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 413) for a large part of the permanent army of Britain. According to Mill, Britain ought to abolish its permanent army except "the scientific corps" (ibid.) and "the amount required for foreign possessions" (Mill to Chadwick, January 2, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1792) – in other words, "for garrisons in India and for colonies whose inhabitants were not yet competent for self-defence" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 413) (cf. fn. 33 above).

The system of a citizen army, which Mill advocated, was as follows: "the whole of the able bodied male population" (Mill to Chadwick, January 2, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1792) had to undergo military drill "at school," and be placed in "a few weeks' training in the field in the first year of manhood" and "a fortnight's drill annually for a few years afterwards" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 413).[35] This was modeled on not the Prussian but rather the

[34]Cairnes published his article entitled "Our Defences: A National or a Standing Army?" in February 1871, and reprinted it in 1873. When reprinting it, Cairnes ([1873] 2004) added one comment (pp. v–vi) and two footnotes (pp. 208, 240).

[35]About two months before "The Army Bill," Mill proposed different periods of the training for "the infantry": "I believe that with previous school drill, *six months training* at first, and *a few days* every succeeding year, would be amply sufficient for *the infantry*" (emphasis added; Mill to Chadwick, January 2, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1792). As

Swiss military system. According to "The Army Bill," "the Prussians" were then "kept in barracks for three years" and "the Liberals of Prussia stood out for" "two years" (ibid.; cf. *CW*, II, pp. 346–348), and Mill opposed those long periods of training.

Mill argued that the military system he advocated would have the following consequences: in times of peace, the productive power of a country would be, on the whole, increased by "the good effects of military training in making them [i.e. 'young men of that age'] more steady and vigorous for the ordinary pursuits of life" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 413), and its military expenditure on the army would be reduced because a large part of its permanent army would be abolished, and "[a] citizen army in time of peace would cost the Government nothing except for the short period of its embodiment" (ibid.); also, in times of war, the power of its army to carry out wars – "our power of meeting an enemy" (ibid., p. 412) – would be increased: "[…] if war should break out, there would be a large army quite ready, and abundant reserves ready to reinforce it if occasion required" (ibid., p. 413).

On the British military reform, Mill supported Leslie ([1867] 1879), Chadwick (1870a) and Cairnes (1871). Thomas Edward Cliffe Leslie (1827–1882) published his article entitled "The Military Systems of Europe" in December 1867. Mill had a high opinion of this article as early as January 1868 (Mill to Chadwick, January 9, 1868, *CW*, XVI, p. 1351); in addition, Mill certainly reread it just before "The Army Bill" (Mill to Leslie, February 5, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1805). Edwin Chadwick (1800–1890) contributed his article entitled "Our Best Military Model" to *The Echo* in December 1870. Four days after the publication of this article, Mill approved it and encouraged Chadwick to go on with his work:

> I noticed the article in the Echo, and remarked how good it was, and although I did not know it was your writing, I saw clearly that the matter must have been obtained from you. The Times had a long extract from the article yesterday [cf. Chadwick (1870b)]. I hope you will go on in the same work. (Mill to Chadwick, December 21, 1870, *CW*, XVII, p. 1788)

As mentioned above, Mill agreed entirely with the article by Cairnes (1871) (Mill to Chadwick, January 15, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1796).

Those three articles and Mill's letters give some additional explanation of his proposal for the British military reform. Firstly, Cairnes, as well as Mill, attached great importance to the costs of armies, and argued that the cost of a citizen army (what he called a "national or popular" army) would be less than that of a permanent army (what he called "a standing army") (cf. Cairnes 1871, pp. 172–177; also Cairnes [1873] 2004,

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for the artillery, Mill said in "The Army Bill": "[…] no doubt artillerymen require long training" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 414).

pp. 208–217). One of Cairnes' purposes was "to put our army into a condition in which it will be at once adequate to the requirements of the country, and not at the same time ruinous to our finances" (Cairnes 1871, p. 172; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, p. 208);[36] according to Cairnes (1871), the expense of "an army numerous enough for our purposes," "maintained on the principle of a standing army of the English pattern," "would mount up to fifty or sixty millions at once" and "be simply ruinous" (p. 180; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 222–223).[37]

Secondly, "previous school drill" (Mill to Chadwick, January 2, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1792) was essential to those short periods of military training advocated by Mill, and to a reduction in British military expenditure. According to Chadwick (1870a), "[i]n Switzerland, boys are drilled in the National Schools from eight years of age […]; and in the secondary, middle class, or superior schools, they are exercised in the use of light arms as soon as they can wield them" (cf. also Chadwick 1870b; Cairnes 1871, p. 189; also Cairnes [1873] 2004, p. 238); Leslie, Chadwick and Cairnes thought unanimously that this drill was one of the causes of the difference between the Prussian and the Swiss military systems in the periods required to train the manhood in a military sense (Leslie [1867] 1879, p. 145; Chadwick 1870a; also Chadwick 1870b; Cairnes 1871, pp. 189, 192–193; also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 237–238, 244). Chadwick took the lead in proposing the introduction of military drill into schools in Britain.[38] The military drill proposed by him was "almost without cost" (Leslie [1867] 1879, p. 146; cf. Mill to Chadwick, December 29, 1866, *CW*, XVI, p. 1224); to explain further, Chadwick estimated that "in round numbers […] under £100,000" per annum would suffice for "the military drill alone" of "three-quarters of a million of male children within the school ages" (Chadwick [1867] 1887, pp. 209–210).[39]

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[36]The other purpose was to clarify "the bearing of popular armies on the disposition of nations towards war" (Cairnes 1871, p. 197; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 251–252); this theme was touched upon by Mill in his letter (Mill to Chadwick, January 2, 1871, *CW*, XVII, p. 1792), but not in "[t]he most complete exposition of Mill's views" (Varouxakis 2013b, p. 169), namely "The Army Bill". Varouxakis (2013a, p. 141; 2013b, pp. 151–153, 164–171, 182–183) chiefly addresses Mill's views on the theme just mentioned, and criticizes previous studies of Mill for the almost complete neglect of "Mill's persistent advocacy of a militia versus a standing army in the last decade of his life" (Varouxakis 2013b, p. 170).

[37]Cairnes (1871) said: "Sir Charles [Edward] Trevelyan" (1807–1886) "considered […] that the financial argument against a standing army was conclusive" (p. 180; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, p. 223).

[38]Already in December 1866, Mill had said: "I have, as you know, always agreed with you as to the importance of introducing military drill into schools, […]" (Mill to Chadwick, December 29, 1866, *CW*, XVI, p. 1224). According to a later letter of Mill, "Chadwick's school drill forms a part" of "the Swiss system" (Mill to Leslie, February 5, 1871, *CW*, XVII, pp. 1805–1806).

[39]Chadwick ([1867] 1887) also declared that, "for the prevention of pauperism," "a

Thirdly, the military system proposed by Mill differed from the Swiss one in that a part of the permanent army – namely, the scientific corps and the amount required for foreign possessions – would be maintained in Mill's system.[40] On this point, Cairnes (1871), for example, said: "The reader will bear in mind that I am considering only the question of home defences. The garrisoning of India and our military stations abroad[41] – for the colonies proper, it is now understood, will provide for their own defence – is a distinct question […]" (p. 191; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, p. 241; fn. 33 above).[42]

Fourthly, the following reasons make it clear that Mill completed his proposal for the British military reform after December 1867 at the earliest;[43] thus this proposal, as well as his approval for the resumption of the right of search, was consistent with Mill's above-stated argument in 1865 (Mill to Beal, April 17, 1865, *CW*, XVI, p. 1034; cf. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above). The first important point is that Mill, in December 1866, declared that he was not acquainted with military subjects: "I do not understand military subjects & can carry no authority upon them" (Mill to Chadwick, December 29, 1866, *CW*, XVI, p. 1225). Even more important is that although Mill, already in February 1867, "had publicly declared himself for a citizen army, adducing the example of the American Civil War" (Varouxakis 2013b, p. 169; cf. also Varouxakis 2013b, pp. 165–166), he did not put his idea into concrete language at that time (*CW*, XXVIII, pp. 128–130). Most important of all is that Leslie ([1867] 1879), according to Mill, had played a leading role in arguing that the British military system ought to be modelled on the Swiss one:

> I will endeavour to refresh my memory of your article in Dec. 1867 & will mention it as opportunities offer. It does you great honour to have taken up the Swiss system so early as the example to be followed in reforming our own. Many thoughtful people are now coming round to the Swiss system […] but the majority even of army reformers are still far behind. (Mill to Leslie, February 5, 1871, *CW*, XVII, pp.

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large sum of money," which was "annually voted by Parliament in aid of the local rates" as "a compensation for the interests affected by free trade," "would be best applied" in the military drill at school, namely "in largely augmenting the efficiency of the labour of the country" (p. 211; cf. also Chadwick 1870a and 1870b).

[40]According to Cairnes (1871), in Switzerland "no troops are maintained permanently on foot" (p. 190; cf. p. 189; also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 237, 240).

[41]"[O]ur military stations abroad" probably corresponded to Mill's word "small posts, like Gibraltar, Aden, or Heligoland" (*CW*, XIX, p. 562).

[42]See also Leslie ([1867] 1879, pp. 134, 142–146) and Cairnes (1871, pp. 190–191, 192, 197; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 241, 243–244, 253).

[43]This assertion is probably consistent with the following argument of Varouxakis (2013b, p. 165): "By the second half of the 1860s," Mill "had clearly been convinced that the Swiss system of citizen militia was the best option" (cf. also Varouxakis 2013a, p. 135).

1805–1806; cf. Mill to James Anthony Froude, March 21, 1867, *CW*, XVI, p. 1258)

Fifthly, in "The Army Bill", Mill addressed no naval systems. On this point, Cairnes (1871) said: "[…] I put aside the question of the navy as foreign to the subject of this paper […]" (p. 169; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, p. 202). Both Mill (*CW*, XXIX, pp. 412–413) and Cairnes (1871, pp. 177–178; cf. also Cairnes [1873] 2004, pp. 218–219) thought the British army, as well as its navy, necessary for self-defence, and focused solely on the systems of armies.[44]

Sixthly and finally, although Mill did not explicitly refer to Adam Smith's (1723–1790) arguments for a standing army in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (five editions: 1776, 1778, 1784, 1786 and 1789; henceforth *Wealth of Nations*), it is possible that Mill was critical of them. The reason is that some of those arguments (Smith [1776] 1976, pp. 694–698, 701–705, 706) were quoted negatively by Leslie ([1867] 1879, pp. 136, 138–139, 140).[45]

To sum up, after December 1867 at the earliest, compulsory military training of "the whole of the able bodied male population" and the consequent abolition of a large part – not the whole – of the permanent army of Britain were regarded by Mill as the means to reduce that portion of its comparatively enormous military expenditure on the army which was related to the British Isles, which could then increase the power of its army to carry out wars. This point was expressed best by Mill when he said in "The Army Bill": "Efficiency is one thing, and economy is one thing, […]. We should try to have – both. (Loud cheers.)" (*CW*, XXIX, p. 412).

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although he systematically addressed only public revenue in the *Principles*, John Stuart Mill talked about the then socially important subject of retrenchment in British public expenditure on many occasions. As the first step toward fuller studies of his views on public expenditure and consequently on public finance, this paper has investigated Mill's views on the amount of British military expenditure in the nineteenth century, examining not only the *Principles* but also his other major works, articles, correspondence, and speeches. According to the *Principles*, military expenditure was devoted to the exercise of one of what Mill called the necessary functions of government; and statistics show that British military expenditure accounted for a larger percentage of public expenditure in Mill's lifetime than did expenditure on civil government.

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[44]For Mill's ideas about navies, see, for example, the *Principles* (*CW*, III, pp. 850, 916–917).

[45]Leslie ([1867] 1879, pp. 145–146) also quoted affirmatively from the *Wealth of Nations* (Smith [1776] 1976, pp. 786–788). Therefore, he was not wholly critical of this book.

The second section argued that Mill thought armed forces were necessary, and that he treated military expenditure not as a part of local authority but rather as a part of central government expenditure. The third section, having turned to public finance of the central government of Britain, postulated that Mill realized that British military expenditure accounted for a large percentage of public expenditure even in times of peace in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and that he, after 1852 at the latest, remarked that this expenditure afforded scope for reduction. Finally, the fourth section mainly examined what Mill proposed as the means for a reduction in British military expenditure: (1) the extension of suffrage, (2) the resumption of the right of seizing enemies' goods in neutral vessels, and (3) the abolition of a large part of the permanent army of Britain. According to Mill, these were the means for a reduction in British military expenditure (especially that part of it related to the British Isles), which could at least maintain the powers of the British army and navy with regard to preventing or carrying out wars. From what has been said in this paper it should be concluded that Mill, at least in the last decade of his life, essentially did not propose the disarmament of Britain and a consequent reduction in its military expenditure (in other words, a mere reduction in it), but instead endeavored to maintain or increase the powers just mentioned, and at the same time greatly to reduce this expenditure.

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